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Abstract 
In recent years, integration requirements have come to play a role in EU immigration law. Several 
directives – the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86), the Long-Term Residents Directive 
(2003/109) and the Blue Card Directive (2009/50) – allow Member States to demand third country 
nationals’ compliance with such requirements. A definition of integration requirements has not, 
however, been provided. This paper distinguishes between two functions of integration requirements: 
one is to equip migrants with the right skills to further their participation in society, whereas the other 
is to operate as a selection criterion, determining, which third country nationals are granted admission, 
residence or access to other rights, and who is to be excluded. An analysis of the three directives 
shows that the integration clauses in those directives do not all have the same function and that there is 
room for a more uniform and consistent concept of integration in EU immigration law. The paper also 
considers, on a more theoretical level, the role played by integration requirements in shaping a 
European concept of citizenship for third county nationals.  
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1. Introduction 
EU law guarantees, to a considerable extent, the free movement and residence of EU citizens and their 
family members within the territories of the Member States. Under the provisions of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on citizenship and free movement of persons, as well as 
Directive 2004/38 (the Residence Directive), the migration of EU citizens and their family members to 
other Member States is subject to two main conditions: the persons concerned must not make 
disproportionate use of public resources in the host state and they must not pose a threat to public 
policy, public security or public health. Integration requirements, such as tests of the immigrants’ 
language skills and knowledge of the host Member State, are not foreseen. Rather, the dominant 
conception with regard to EU citizens and their family members is that their integration will be 
furthered through a strong legal position and equal treatment with nationals.1 
In a parallel development, since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the body of EU law has come to also 
include measures on the entry and residence of third-country nationals who are not family members of 
EU citizens. A number of legislative instruments have been adopted as part of the Union’s common 
policy on asylum and immigration, several of which contain clauses on integration requirements. This 
reflects a development in several Member States whereby considerations regarding the capacity of 
immigrants to integrate have increasingly come to play a role in determining their eligibility for 
membership, including residence rights and naturalisation.2 A report by the European Commission on 
the application of the Long-term Residents Directive indicates that in 2011 fourteen Member States 
had enacted some form of integration requirement for the acquisition of long-term resident status by 
third country nationals.3 In addition, six Member States (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom) have now adopted ‘pre-departure’ integration requirements that 
immigrants – mostly family migrants – must meet before they are admitted to the host state.4  
The legislative history of the various migration directives shows that several Member States, in 
particular Austria, the Netherlands and Germany, have pushed for the possibility to apply integration 
requirements.5 Yet, the incorporation of integration clauses in the EU migration directives means that 
integration has also become a condition of European immigration law, which has its own dynamic and 
cannot be understood solely by reference to national systems. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, 
to investigate the European concept of integration as it emerges from the said directives. My aim is not 
to explain the political processes that have led to the adoption of integration requirements at the EU 
level, or to see how the insertion of the integration clauses can be traced back to the influence of 
certain Member States or other actors. Instead I will attempt to link these clauses to underlying legal 
concepts of integration, in order to better understand the role they play in shaping the membership of 
third country nationals in the EU. Section 2 distinguishes between two concepts of integration, both of 
which could explain the adoption of integration requirements. Section 3 analyses the integration 
clauses in three directives, the Family Reunification Directive, the Long-term Residents Directive and 
the Blue Card Directive, in relation to the previously identified concepts. Lastly, section 4 connects 
both concepts to broader theoretical discussions on citizenship and integration. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Groenendijk 2004, pp. 124-125. 
2 This development has been addressed in a growing body of literature over the past years. See, notably, Michalowski 2005; 
Carrera 2009; Guild et al 2009; Van Oers et al 2010; Groenendijk 2011; Michalowski 2011 and Bonjour 2012. 
3 COM(2011) 585 final, published on 28 September 2011. 
4 Groenendijk 2011; Austria enacted a pre-departure integration requirement as per 1 July 2011, see Art. 21a Niederlassungs- 
und Aufenthaltsgesetz (accessible at www.bmi.gv.at).  
5 Groenendijk 2004, pp. 119-124; Carrera 2009, pp. 163-183; Bonjour 2012, p. 6. 
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2. Legal concepts of integration 
 
2.1. Selection versus facilitation 
In an important article published in 2004, Kees Groenendijk distinguishes between three perspectives 
on integration.6 The first perspective is that immigrant integration is enhanced through equal treatment 
and a secure residence status. From the second and third perspectives this relationship is inverted: 
integration comes before legal status. Successful integration, or at least the demonstrated ability to 
integrate, is seen as a condition for naturalisation or permanent resident status (the second perspective) 
or even for admission into the country (the third perspective).7  
In this paper I seek to build on the above distinction by making a further refinement. In particular, 
I differentiate between two views that can explain the adoption of integration requirements. By 
integration requirements, I understand legal provisions that oblige or coerce immigrants to obtain or 
demonstrate a capacity for successful integration. Both views presented below presuppose that 
integration depends, at least to a certain extent, on certain individual skills or qualities (e.g. literacy or 
language proficiency) that migrants must possess. However, one view sees integration requirements as 
an instrument to control immigration and access to rights (selection), whereas taken from the other 
viewpoint the objective is to ensure the acquisition by migrants of the said skills and qualities without 
excluding them (facilitation).8 Whereas, in practice, integration requirements usually entail that 
immigrants must learn the language of the host Member State or become acquainted with the country 
and its society,9 it will be seen that the EU directives do not define what is to be understood by 
‘integration’, thus potentially leaving room for other types of requirements. 
In the first approach, the function of integration requirements is to differentiate between aliens 
who are, and those who are not, eligible for admission and residence in a Member State. In other 
words, integration requirements are used as an instrument of immigration control, to select immigrants 
on the basis of their capacity for integration. This corresponds to the second and third perspectives 
described by Groenendijk. Where integration requirements are used as a selection criterion, this will 
usually occur on the premise that immigrants who lack the skills or qualities deemed necessary for 
successful integration will place too much of a burden on the host society and therefore should not be 
admitted or granted the rights attached to legal residence. An alternative but closely related motive is 
to reserve access to certain membership rights for immigrants who have ‘earned’ such access through 
prior integration, in other words membership is seen as the reward for successful integration.10  An 
important feature of integration requirements, used as selection criteria, is that those who are not able 
or not willing to comply with them are subsequently excluded. The purpose of such requirements is 
therefore not primarily to enhance the individual integration capacity of those immigrants who seek 
admission or residence, but rather to ensure that persons who lack this capacity are not admitted, so as 
not to disrupt the integration process within the host Member State.11 Conceptually, the possibility of 
integration as a selection criterion is not limited to situations where integration is a condition for 
admission or residence but can apply to other rights as well. A common example is the use of 
naturalisation tests to govern access to nationality. Another, rather more extreme, example is the 
proposal, made two years ago by an MP of the Dutch Liberal party (VVD), to make immigrants’ 
                                                     
6 Groenendijk 2004, p. 113. See, in a similar vein, Kostakopoulou et al 2009. 
7 On this ‘reversal’ of integration concepts see also Vermeulen 2010, pp. 87-89. 
8 Cp. Bonjour 2010, p. 305. 
9 Michalowski 2005; Van Oers et al 2010. On naturalisation tests see also Michalowski 2011. 
10 Groenendijk 2004, p. 113. 
11 Michalowski 2005, p. 77; Bonjour 2010, pp. 306-307; De Vries 2011, pp. 55-56. Of course, it is likely that immigrants 
who pass an integration test before being admitted will have a greater capacity for integration upon arrival. In this sense, 
selective integration requirements can also function as an instrument of preparation or facilitation. However, the objective 
of preparation alone does not explain why those who do not meet the requirement are subsequently excluded. 
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access to social assistance dependent on their level of proficiency in the Dutch language.12 However, 
under the EU directives discussed in this paper access to naturalisation and social benefits are either 
not covered or are not subject to integration requirements.  
Besides functioning as selection criteria, integration requirements can also serve to facilitate the 
integration of immigrants. A study by Michalowski shows that several Member States introduced 
mandatory integration programmes before including integration conditions in their immigration laws, 
in general with the aim of increasing the autonomy and labour market skills of newly arrived 
immigrants.13 Such obligatory integration programmes can be considered as a form of compulsory 
education, meant to ensure that immigrants obtain the knowledge and skills they are believed to lack 
because they did not go to school in the host Member State. Like in the case of compulsory education, 
there are broadly two reasons why integration may be obligatory. Governments may impose 
integration requirements on paternalistic grounds; because they believe it to be in the best interest of 
the migrants themselves.14 They may also do so because they believe that a lack of the skills or 
abilities deemed necessary for integration will constitute a burden for the rest of society. Hence, the 
underlying motive may be the same as when the purpose is selection. When a state seeks to facilitate 
integration, however, the underlying premise will be that the immigrants who must integrate are, or 
will be, included rather than excluded. Where integration requirements are introduced to facilitate 
integration, this does not have to clash with the first perspective outlined by Groenendijk, which 
entails that integration follows the granting of a secure residence status. Rather, a strong residence 
status, equal treatment and participation in integration courses or programmes can all be seen as 
instruments to further immigrant inclusion. Both integration conditions and mandatory integration 
programmes are, however, based on the assumption that integration is, at least partly, a result that 
depends on the existence of particular qualities or characteristics on the part of individual 
immigrants.15   
 
2.2. The legal character of integration requirements 
It can be expected that the choice for one of the above concepts of integration (as a selection criterion 
for immigrants or as inclusion to be realised through mandatory courses or programmes) will affect 
the form in which integration requirements are implemented in national or European legislation in 
various ways. First, it can be expected that there will be a difference in terms of the legal effect of the 
requirements. Where integration is seen as a selection criterion, integration requirements will normally 
be formulated as conditions for the acquisition of rights. Such conditions do not, in themselves, 
compel immigrants to participate in an integration programme or to study the language of the host 
state. However, in case of non-compliance the sanction will be one of exclusion from access to 
residence or other benefits. Conversely, where the purpose is inclusion this kind of exclusionary 
sanction does not fit. In this case integration requirements are more likely to take the form of an 
obligation: immigrants may be obliged, by law, to learn the language or to attend a course. Usually 
such obligations will also be backed by some kind of sanction, such as a (penal or administrative) fine. 
Unlike in the case of conditions, however, the effect of the sanction will not be to exclude the person 
concerned. 
Second, the chosen perspective on integration is also likely to influence the content of integration 
requirements. Such requirements can take the form of an obligation of result, for example a test, 
whereby immigrants must demonstrate that they have reached a certain level of language proficiency 
and/or knowledge of the host society. Alternatively, they can consist of an obligation of effort, 
requiring the immigrant to participate in an integration course or programme (possibly preceded by a 
                                                     
12 Parliamentary Papers (Kamerstukken) II 2009-2010, 32 328, No. 2. At the time of writing the proposal was still pending 
before the Dutch Parliament. Notwithstanding the amendments made after a critical opinion from the Council of State, it 
still contains the possibility to fully withdraw social assistance benefits if the recipient does not meet the language 
requirement (Parl. Papers II 2010-2011, 32 328, No. 6).  
13 Michalowski 2005, pp. 80-81. 
14 Fermin 2000b 
15 Michalowski 2005, p. 88.  
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test to determine their level). Where the integration requirement is meant to serve as a selection 
criterion, it seems rational that it is formulated as an obligation of result. This may also be the case 
where the purpose is facilitation, namely if it is considered that a minimum level of knowledge is 
necessary for the person concerned to get by (compare high school exams, whereby pupils must also 
show they have reached a certain level). However, where the purpose is facilitation it will have to be 
taken into account that the obligation that can be imposed is necessarily limited by the capability of 
the person concerned. To impose sanctions on persons for not doing something they are simply unable 
to do would have to be regarded as unreasonable. The Dutch Integration Act 2007, for example, 
contains an exemption for persons who are unable, despite demonstrated efforts, to pass the civic 
integration exam. This notwithstanding, the obligation to attend an integration course (an obligation of 
effort) fits more comfortably with the purpose of facilitation. 
Third, it can be expected that the choice between facilitation and selection also influences the 
phase of the immigration process in which integration requirements play a role. If the purpose is 
selection, the requirement will have to be met before the right in question is granted. This may be 
before admission (integration abroad) or after admission but before the person is granted permanent 
residence, naturalisation or access to other rights. On the other hand, the objective of facilitation will 
only come into play once the immigrant has been legally included, that is after admission or even 
long-term residence has been granted. 
 
In practice, of course, all the elements above do not always point in the same direction. For example, 
in France, immigrants must meet an integration requirement before entry but they are not expected to 
demonstrate a certain level of knowledge or language skills. Instead, their level is tested and, if found 
to be too low, they are required to participate in a course. Entry will not, however, be denied because 
the person’s capacities to integrate have not sufficiently improved.16 Another example is Denmark, 
where integration tests are administered after the person concerned has been granted entry on a short-
term visa.17 The above distinctions may be used, however, to categorise different types of integration 
requirements and also to point out potential inconsistencies in their implementation. They are 
summarised in the table below. 
 
Purpose of the integration 
requirement 
Selection 
(integration condition) 
Facilitation 
(integration obligation) 
Sanction in case of non-
compliance 
Exclusion from admission, 
residence or other rights 
Fine 
Content  Obligation of result (test) Obligation of effort 
(programme or course) 
Timing Before acquisition of right After legal admission or 
granting of long-term 
residence 
 
 
3. Integration requirements in the EU migration directives 
Integration requirements can be found in three of the EU migration directives, namely the Family 
Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC), the Long-term Residents Directive (2003/109/EC) and the Blue 
Card Directive (2009/50/EC). All three directives were adopted on the basis of Art. 63 (3) and (4) of 
the Treaty on European Community (currently Art. 79 (2)(a) and (b) TFEU). This section first 
discusses the legal basis provided in the Treaty and then reviews the integration clauses in the separate 
directives. 
 
 
                                                     
16 Bonjour 2010, p. 303. 
17 Bonjour 2012, p. 4. 
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3.1. The Treaty basis: Article 79 TFEU 
According to Article 79 (1) TFEU, the EU is to develop a common immigration policy which aims to 
ensure the efficient management of migration flows, the fair treatment of legally residing third country 
nationals and the prevention of illegal immigration and human trafficking. For this purpose, the EU 
may adopt measures regarding ‘the conditions of entry and residence’ of third country nationals and 
‘the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States’ (Art. 79 
(2)(a) and (b) TFEU). In addition, Article 79 (4) TFEU provides a legal basis, newly inserted by the 
Lisbon Treaty, for ‘measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a 
view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories’.  The 
latter provision, however, expressly excludes ‘any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States’. As Article 79 TFEU shows, the European immigration policy pursues different aims, 
which include controlling immigration and promoting the integration and fair treatment of migrants 
who are already there. The Treaty thus provides a basis for measures that exclude migrants as well as 
for measures enabling their inclusion into the Member States. The tension that may exist between 
these aims becomes manifest, for example, with regard to the issue of family reunification or the rights 
of third country nationals to move between the Member States.  
With regard to integration requirements, in particular, the Treaty does not contain any express 
references, hence it remains unclear from Article 79 TFEU what such requirements can entail or for 
what purpose they can be adopted. The terms of Article 79 (2)(a) and (b) are nevertheless sufficiently 
broad to allow for the enactment of integration requirements, especially where compliance with these 
requirements is a condition for the acquisition or non-withdrawal of entry or residence rights or 
freedom of movement. On the other hand, it is less clear whether the above provisions also grant a 
legal basis for integration requirements that are not also immigration requirements, but are merely 
aimed at facilitating the inclusion of migrants who already have (or certainly will obtain) legal 
residence. It could perhaps be argued that such integration requirements, where they apply specifically 
to legally admitted immigrants, are still ‘conditions of residence’ within the meaning of Article 79 
(2)(a) and (b), even if non-compliance is not sanctioned by a denial of residence status. Since such 
requirements are aimed, despite their coercive nature, at immigrant inclusion, it may be also argued 
that they are instrumental to the purpose of ensuring the fair treatment of third country nationals. Yet 
this interpretation does appear to be stretching the terms of Article 79 (1) and (2) rather broadly. 
Instead, integration requirements that are used to control entry and residence seem to fit more easily 
within the legal framework of these provisions.  
Article 79 (4) TFEU, on the other hand, does not provide a basis for any coercive measures or 
requirements in the field of integration. The measures proposed in this provision do not directly relate 
to the legal position of third country nationals but instead concern the relationship between the Union 
and the Member States, stating that the latter may be provided with incentives and support for national 
policies to promote integration. Such incentives and support are currently provided through the EU 
Framework on Integration, for which Article 79 (4)  TFEU provides a legal basis.18 While national 
policies can also include integration requirements, including compulsory integration programmes for 
legally resident immigrants, the application of such requirements is not circumscribed by Article 79 
(4). Nevertheless, Article 79 (4) does reinforce the question raised above with regard to integration 
requirements that are not aimed at immigration control. If the Union has only a limited competence to 
promote the integration of legally residing immigrants, excluding any harmonisation, then it seems 
even less likely that the measures mentioned in Article 79 (2)(a) and (b) TFEU could also include 
integration obligations that are aimed at facilitation and inclusion.  
In view of the above, it might be concluded that the integration clauses in the various migration 
directives have to be understood as integration conditions, which have the purpose of selecting 
immigrants. As the analysis below will show, however, the language of the directives is often much 
more ambiguous. Lastly, before continuing, it should be noted that none of the directives actually 
require Member States to impose integration conditions or obligations. Rather they leave it up to the 
Member States to decide if they want to impose such requirements in accordance with their national 
                                                     
18 Carrera 2009, p. 108.  
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law. In doing so, however, EU law does frame the room for discretion that is left to the Member States 
and as such contributes to determining the role that integration requirements can fulfil. 
 
3.2. The Family Reunification Directive 
The Family Reunification Directive (FRD) determines the conditions for the exercise of the right to 
family reunification by third-country nationals. It contains two clauses relating to integration.  
 
Art. 4 (1), final subparagraph, FRD reads: 
 
[…] where a child is aged over 12 years and arrives independently from the rest of his/her 
family, the Member State may, before authorising entry and residence under this Directive, 
verify whether he or she meets a condition for integration provided for by its existing 
legislation on the date of implementation of this Directive. 
  
Article 7 (2) FRD reads: 
 
Member States may require third country nationals to comply with integration measures, in 
accordance with national law. 
With regard to the refugees and/or family members of refugees referred to in Article 12 the 
integration measures referred to in the first subparagraph may only be applied once the 
persons concerned have been granted family reunification. 
 
Because of the standstill clause included in Article 4 (1), final subparagraph, FRD this provision only 
has real meaning for Germany, which was the only country to have included integration requirements 
for children over 12 in its legislation on the date of implementation of the Directive (3 October 
2005).19 Nevertheless, the provision can still give useful indications as regards the integration concept 
expressed in the FRD. 
It seems quite clear from the terms of the above provisions that they contain the possibility for 
Member States to impose integration requirements as a condition for the acquisition of the right to 
family reunification, meaning that this right can be denied if the condition is not met. Article 7 forms 
part of Chapter IV, entitled ‘requirements for the exercise of the right to family reunification’. Apart 
from integration requirements, Article 7 mentions a number of other conditions that must be met if 
family reunification is to be granted, relating to income, accommodation and sickness insurance. 
Evidence of these conditions being met must be provided when the application for family reunification 
is made (Art. 7 (1) FRD). It also follows from Article 4 (1),  final subparagraph, (‘before authorising 
entry and residence’) and a contrario from the second sentence of Article 7 (2) that third-country 
nationals may be required to comply with integration requirements before family reunification is 
granted. This is confirmed by Article 15 (3) of the Blue Card Directive.20 It is therefore plausible that 
the integration requirements mentioned in Article 7 (2) FRD are meant to function as selection criteria, 
rather than instruments for the facilitation of integration. 
Several authors have argued that the use of the term ‘integration measures’, instead of ‘integration 
conditions’, in Article 7 (2) implies that non-compliance with such measures may not result in the 
refusal of admission to the Member State where family reunification is sought, or at least that the 
obligation must be one of effort and not of result.21 These authors mostly rely on the legislative history 
of the Long-term Residents Directive, adopted shortly after the FRD, which shows that the term 
                                                     
19 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2003/86/EC on 
the right to family reunification, COM(2008) 610 final, p. 5. According to the same report, Cyprus also introduced 
integration conditions under Art. 4 (1), final subparagraph, but only after the implementation deadline. 
20 Art. 15 (3) BCD states that ‘by way of derogation from the final subparagraph of Article 4 (1) and Article 7 (2) of 
Directive 2003/86/EC, the integration conditions and measures referred to therein may only be applied after the persons 
concerned have been granted family reunification [emph. KV]’. 
21 See, amongst others, Groenendijk 2004, pp. 122-124; Brinkmann 2008, p. 40; Carrera 2009, p. 195 and Pascouau 2010, 
pp. 445-446. 
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‘integration conditions’ was favoured by those Member States supporting a restrictive immigration 
policy (notably Austria, Germany and the Netherlands).22 However, while the legislative history does 
indeed confirm that a distinction was made by certain Member States between ‘integration measures’ 
and ‘conditions’, it does not indicate that a specific meaning was attributed to these terms, nor does it 
give insight into the reasons why the use of either term was supported or rejected by the other Member 
States. In fact, when looking at the different language versions of the FRD and of other migration 
Directives, there seems to be little consistency: ‘integration conditions’ and ‘integration measures’ are 
sometimes used interchangeably, whereas at other times they are replaced by different terms 
altogether.23 
Nevertheless, there are also elements in the FRD that collide with the understanding of integration 
requirements as an instrument of selection. Recital 4 of the preamble to the Directive reads: 
 
Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create 
sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the Member 
State, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion, a fundamental 
Community objective stated in the Treaty.  
 
According to this, the integration of third-country nationals is furthered if family reunification is 
allowed. Of course, this view is not as such incompatible with the idea that family reunification may 
also lead to integration-related problems if the family members who are admitted have trouble settling 
in (which, as we saw above, is normally the reason for selecting third-country nationals on the basis of 
their integration capacity). However, one would expect the Member States to decide what they 
consider to be more harmful to the integration process: the fact that third-country nationals already 
resident in their territories would be deprived of the company of their family members, or the fact that 
allowing family reunification will result in the presence of a new group of third-country nationals who 
must also be integrated. In this respect, the makers of the Directive seem to have been torn between 
two alternatives, one of which is reflected in the preamble and the other in the text of the Directive 
(even if, as a matter of legal interpretation, the latter prevails). 
This conflict between different concepts of integration was also at stake in a case decided by the 
EU Court of Justice (CoJ) in 2006, in which the European Parliament sought annulment of various 
provisions of the Family Reunification Directive, including Article 4 (1), final subparagraph.24 Before 
the Court, the Parliament contended that the Community legislator had ‘confused the concepts 
“condition for integration” and “objective of integration”’. It held that, ‘since one of the most 
important means of successfully integrating a minor child is reunification with his or her family’, it is 
incongruous to impose a condition for integration before the child […] joins the sponsor’.25 This 
reasoning was not followed by the CoJ, as appears from the following considerations:26  
 
Contrary to the Parliament’s submissions, the Community legislature has not confused 
conditions for integration referred to in the final subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the 
Directive and the objective of integration of minors which could, according to the 
Parliament, be achieved by means such as measures facilitating their integration after they 
have been allowed to enter. Two different matters are indeed involved. As follows from the 
12th recital in the preamble to the Directive, the possibility of limiting the right to family 
reunification of children over the age of 12 whose primary residence is not with the sponsor 
is intended to reflect the children’s capacity for integration at early ages and is to ensure 
that they acquire the necessary education and language skills in school.  
 
                                                     
22 Groenendijk 2004, pp. 122-124; Carrera 2009, pp. 175-183. 
23 De Vries 2011, pp. 193-194. 
24 CoJ 27 June 2006, C-540/03, [2006] ECR, p. I-5769 (Parliament v. Council). 
25 Parliament v. Council judgment, para. 40.  
26 Parliament v. Council judgment, paras. 67-69. 
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The Community legislature thus considered that, beyond 12 years of age, the objective of 
integration cannot be achieved as easily and, consequently, provided that a Member State 
has the right to have regard to a minimum level of capacity for integration when deciding 
whether to authorise entry and residence under the Directive.  
 
A condition for integration within the meaning of the final subparagraph of Article 4(1) of 
the Directive may therefore be taken into account when considering an application for 
family reunification and the Community legislature did not contradict itself by authorising 
Member States, in the specific circumstances envisaged by that provision, to consider 
applications in the light of such a condition in the context of a directive which, as is 
apparent from the fourth recital in its preamble, has the general objective of facilitating the 
integration of third country nationals in Member States by making family life possible 
through reunification. 
 
In the above case, no challenge was brought against Article 7 (2) FRD and the Court does not refer to 
it. Instead, it found that the general objective of the Directive is to facilitate integration through family 
reunification and that the possibility to set integration conditions for children over 12 only presents a 
minor exception to this rule. As said before, however, the fact that integration conditions may be 
imposed on the basis of Article 7 (2) makes it hard to maintain that the facilitation of integration, 
through family reunification, is indeed the primary integration concept underlying the Directive. The 
contradiction thus remains. 
Lastly, the concept of ‘integration as selection’ also does not apply in the case of family 
reunification of refugees. Here, Member States may impose integration requirements only after family 
reunification has been granted (Art. 7 (2) and Art. 10 (1) FRD). This can be explained by the specific 
plight of refugees, for whom family reunification in the country of origin is not an option. This is 
recalled in the preamble to the Directive (recital 8), which adds that ‘more favourable conditions 
should therefore be laid down for the exercise of [the right to family reunification of refugees]’. In 
view of these circumstances, it must be concluded that for family members of refugees the integration 
conditions referred to in Article 7 (2) FRD cannot be understood as constituting conditions for 
residence in the Member State, either before or after family reunification has taken place. Instead, 
integration requirements for this group can be imposed only after the family has been reunited and 
only as a form of facilitation. This implies that non-compliance may be sanctioned, for example by a 
fine, but not through termination of residence. 
 
3.3. The Long-term Residents Directive 
The Long-term Residents Directive (LRD) determines both the conditions under which third-country 
nationals must be granted long-term resident status in a Member State (a strong status which can be 
obtained after five years of legal residence) and the conditions under which those who have been 
granted this status can take up residence in another Member State. As such, the Directive goes some 
way towards extending the right to free movement in the EU from EU citizens to third-country 
nationals, although its provisions are rather more restrictive. The LRD also contains two clauses on 
integration requirements. 
 
Article 5 (2) LRD concerns the conditions for acquiring long-term resident status and reads: 
Member States may require third country nationals to comply with integration conditions, 
in accordance with national law. 
 
Article 15 (3) LRD concerns the conditions for residence in a second Member State and reads: 
Member States may require third country nationals to comply with integration measures, in 
accordance with national law.  
This condition shall not apply where the third country nationals concerned have been 
required to comply with integration conditions in order to be granted long-term resident 
status, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 (2). 
Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, the persons concerned may be required to 
attend language courses. 
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Looking at the above provisions, the Long-term Residents Directive (LRD) also presents a somewhat 
ambiguous picture. Both provisions allow the Member States to ask that third-county nationals comply 
with integration requirements in accordance with national law. Article 5 LRD is headed ‘Conditions 
for acquiring long-term resident status’, whereas Article 15 LRD is headed ‘Conditions for residence 
in a second Member State’. This suggests that both long-term resident status and the right to reside in 
a second Member State can be denied if the integration requirements imposed by a Member State are 
not met. With regard to Article 15 (3) this is reinforced by Articles 14 (1), 19 (2) and 22 (1)(b) LRD, 
which state that the right to reside in a second Member State can be denied, withdrawn or not be 
renewed if the conditions set out in Article 15 are not met. From Article 9 LRD it can be derived that 
long-term resident status as such cannot be lost or withdrawn because of the failure to comply with 
integration requirements. This would mean that such requirements could only be applied before the 
status is granted. With regard to residence in the second Member State, however, it can be derived 
from Article 15 (3), read in combination with 19 (2) and 22 (1)(b), that integration requirements can 
form a condition for the denial as well as withdrawal of this right. This suggests that integration 
requirements could possibly also be imposed after entry, although if they are they would still be 
functioning as selection criteria.  
There are, however, also elements in the LRD that do not sit comfortably with the conclusion that 
integration requirements may be used to select immigrants. Article 15 (3) provides that, if the third-
country national has already complied with integration requirements to obtain the status of long-term 
resident in the first Member State, the second Member State may only require participation in 
language courses.27 As explained in paragraph 2, such an obligation functions better as a form of 
facilitation than as a selection criterion. It will moreover not always be practically feasible to ask, for 
example, that a person holding long-term resident status in Estonia takes a Dutch course there before 
moving to the Netherlands. Arguably, therefore, the exemption in Article 15 (3) LRD must be 
understood thus: that long-term residents who have already complied with integration requirements in 
the first Member State cannot be denied admission to the second Member State on this ground. The 
second Member State may, however, require that these persons participate in a language course as a 
way of facilitating their integration. 
The preamble of the LRD also points more towards an inclusionary perspective on integration. 
Recitals 1 and 12 state that the aim of the Directive is to give long-term resident third-country 
nationals a number of uniform rights that are as close as possible to those of EU citizens, and that the 
social integration of long-term residents will be enhanced by ensuring that they enjoy ‘equality of 
treatment with citizens of the Member State in a wide range of economic and social matters, under the 
relevant conditions defined by this Directive’. Here again, it seems that the preamble and the text of 
the LRD reflect two different conceptions of integration: the idea that integration is furthered by a 
strong legal status and the idea that integration functions as a condition for the acquisition of rights.28  
 
3.4. The Blue Card Directive 
The Blue Card Directive (BCD) concerns the conditions for entry to, and residence in, the EU Member 
States of highly qualified workers and their family members. The purpose of this Directive, as stated 
in the preamble, is to enhance the competitiveness of the EU economy by making the EU a more 
attractive place to work for highly qualified third country nationals. The Directive also grants EU Blue 
Card holders and their family members a right to move to another Member State, thus creating a 
limited form of free movement for third country nationals. An integration clause is included in Article 
15, which concerns the conditions under which Blue Card holders can be joined by their family 
members. It reads: 
 
                                                     
27 The Council documents show that this exception was introduced because it was considered undesirable for third-country 
nationals to have to pass an integration test twice. See Council doc. 12624/02 of October 2002, p. 2. 
28 See also Iglesias Sánchez 2009. 
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‘Directive 2003/86/EC [the Family Reunification Directive, KV] shall apply with the 
derogations laid down in this Article. 
[…] 
By way of derogation from the last subparagraph of Article 4 (1) and Article 7 (2) of 
Directive 2003/86/EC, the integration conditions and measures referred to therein may only 
be applied after the persons concerned have been granted family reunification.’ 
 
On the point of integration requirements the BCD is quite straightforward. Applicants for, or holders 
of, an EU Blue Card are not themselves subject to integration requirements, either when entering the 
EU for the first time or when moving to a second Member State. For family members, integration 
requirements may be imposed by the first Member State but only after family reunification has been 
granted. This means that the admission of family members of EU Blue Card holders in the first 
Member State is not conditional on the fulfilment of integration requirements, which is in line with the 
purpose of the Directive: if family members could be denied access on the ground that they are 
insufficiently integrated this could of course make the EU a less attractive destination for highly 
qualified workers. This is also reflected in recital 23 of the preamble, which states that: ‘favourable 
conditions for family reunification […] should be a fundamental element of this Directive which aims 
to attract highly qualified third-country workers. Specific derogations to [the FRD] should be provided 
for in order to reach this aim.’ 
The BCD thus allows integration requirements for family members only after admission has been 
granted. The Directive does not indicate whether the residence permit of family members could be 
withdrawn or not renewed on the ground that integration requirements have not been met. However it 
seems clear that this would also work against the purpose of the Directive. It therefore seems more 
likely that, in the context of the BCD, integration requirements function as an instrument of facilitation 
rather than selection. 
As to the type of integration requirements that may be imposed, recital 23 of the preamble 
continues by stating that ‘The derogation included in Article 15 (3) […] does not preclude Member 
States from maintaining or introducing integration conditions and measures, including language 
learning, for the members of the family of an EU Blue Card holder.’ As was remarked above, 
language courses, as opposed to language tests, fit well with the purpose of facilitating integration. 
However other types of integration requirements – including tests – are not as such excluded by the 
BCD. 
 
Before concluding the legal analysis, it may be observed that the meaning of the integration clauses 
must not be determined only by reference to the directives but must instead take into account the 
broader context of EU law. This includes the provisions of the TFEU, which were already discussed at 
the beginning of this section, as well as the general principles of EU law. These principles, including 
the principles of effectiveness, proportionality and respect for fundamental rights, co-determine the 
boundaries within which Member States must act when adopting and applying integration 
requirements.29 It follows that Member States will be precluded, inter alia, from enacting integration 
requirements that effectively preclude the exercise of the rights granted in the directives or that would 
result in a denial of family reunification in violation of the right to respect for family life. I do not 
believe, however, that the general principles affect the conditional or obligatory character of 
integration requirements, nor do they point in the direction of different concepts of integration than 
those emerging from the analysis above.  
 
4. Integration requirements and theories of citizenship  
Whereas the previous section examined which concept of integration is best suited to explain the 
integration requirements in the various directives, this section aims to put both of the concepts 
presented in section 2 in a broader theoretical perspective. While not attempting to present a fully-
fledged theoretical or normative framework, it seeks to identify possible justifications for, and 
                                                     
29 E.g. ECJ 4 March 2010, C-578/08, [2010] ECR, p. I-1839 (Chakroun), par. 43. 
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objections to, integration requirements by linking them to political theories of citizenship and 
integration. Section 4.2. specifically considers the obligatory or even exclusionary character of 
integration requirements. 
 
4.1. The content of integration requirements – how is citizenship defined? 
The term ‘citizenship’ is commonly used to indicate membership in a political community. Citizenship 
normally entails the existence of a legal bond that links individuals to a political entity (a state, the 
EU). In this sense, any legal status granted to immigrants (temporary or permanent resident status) can 
also be considered partial forms of citizenship. Citizenship is, however, not a matter of legal status 
alone. Different theories of citizenship have considered citizens as persons who are entitled to certain 
rights, who participate in the political, economic or social life of a community or who share a sense of 
mutual loyalty and belonging.30 The question of who is a citizen is closely linked to the question of 
how the substance of citizenship is defined.  The definition of citizenship that is chosen will therefore 
influence the criteria or requirements that immigrants must meet in order to become members of the 
community, be it as nationals or as legal residents.  
Much of the criticism that has been brought to bear against integration requirements concerns the 
tendency of such requirements to present an overly thick or culturally loaded conception of 
citizenship, especially where programmes or tests include country knowledge or topics such as shared 
values and social norms. This criticism is often grounded in the principles of liberal political theory, 
which do not allow an exceedingly prescriptive state-sponsored idea of ‘the good citizen’.31 A related 
concern is that integration tests present ‘the culture’ or ‘the identity’ of the host state as something 
static and essential, disregarding the many different views and attitudes existing within the host 
society and necessarily excluding those coming from outside.32 
As the integration provisions in the EU migration directives do not prescribe the content of 
integration programmes or tests, or the objectives to be pursued in terms of substantive citizenship, the 
above criticisms may have more relevance at the national level. What remains, nevertheless, is the fact 
that integration requirements by definition place a demand on immigrants to make some effort or to 
demonstrate some quality or skill. Integration requirements are not, therefore, compatible with a 
liberal account whereby citizenship is defined only in terms of rights and integration, meaning only 
that immigrants are granted the same rights as the citizens of the host state. Other accounts of 
citizenship are, however, available, which attribute certain qualities to the status of being a citizen and 
so provide motives for the adoption of integration requirements, without going so far as to require 
cultural assimilation or adaptation to a single national identity.33  
With regard to the rights dimension, a more liberal-egalitarian view of citizenship stresses not only 
that citizens have legal rights but also that the state has a responsibility to resolve differences in 
starting positions which lead to social inequality. From this perspective, integration programmes can 
serve to enhance emancipation as they provide immigrants with language skills and practical 
information about everyday life in a new country. Alternatively, (neo-)republican and (national-
)communitarian citizenship theories have drawn attention to the dimensions of participation and 
belonging. At least theoretically, integration requirements could fulfil a role with regard to each of 
these dimensions. Language and vocational training, or courses explaining the host state’s democratic 
system, may serve to equip citizens with the skills and abilities needed to participate in political life or 
in the labour market. Participation, as well as knowledge of the language of the host state, can perhaps 
                                                     
30 See the very illuminating analysis of the idea of citizenship in Bosniak 2006, in particular on pp. 17-36.  
31 For example, Spijkerboer 2007, pp. 67-72; Vermeulen 2010, pp. 136-139; On the liberal nature of citizenship tests see also 
Michalowski 2011 and  Bauböck & Joppke 2010. 
32 Spijkerboer 2007, op. cit; Carrera 2009, pp. 441-449; see also the contributions by Kostakopoulou and Carrera & Guild in 
Bauböck & Joppke 2010. 
33 For an overview of theories of citizenship see, for example, Fermin 2000a. See also Van Blom & Van Schilt-Mol 2001. 
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also play a positive role in enhancing identification with the host society and interaction amongst 
different groups of the population.34   
An important criticism of integration tests has been made by Kostakopoulou, who claims that 
integration happens as a result of social interaction and cannot be reduced to a unilateral process of 
learning on the part of newcomers.35 While I agree to a large extent with the characterisation of 
integration as a dynamic and interactive process, I also believe that it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that such processes maybe helped when immigrants acquire certain skills, especially language 
proficiency. Whether, and to what extent, this is indeed the case is a matter to be determined through 
empirical evidence. It is furthermore important to note that integration requirements do not need to 
stand by themselves, instead they may form part of a broader integration policy that also includes, for 
example, measures to prevent discrimination and to ensure the accessibility of public benefits and 
institutions. 
 
4.2. Obligations and conditions- how can citizenship be assured? 
Although, as can be seen above, the way in which integration is promoted cannot be fully detached 
from the ideal of citizenship that is pursued, theoretically a distinction can be drawn between the 
definition of the substance of citizenship and the way in which states seek to ensure that immigrants 
become full citizens. The latter aspect, which relates to the question of why integration measures take 
the form of obligations or conditions, is rarely addressed in citizenship theory. Nevertheless, in the 
following I will attempt to address some of the issues that come up in this regard. 
 
Integration obligations 
Probably prompted by the developments in the Member States, the literature on integration 
requirements has thus far focused mostly on the exclusionary effects of integration conditions, 
whereas not much attention has been paid to the coercive nature of integration obligations.36 Such 
obligations do affect third country nationals’ access to citizenship because they are not sanctioned by 
exclusion. Nevertheless, a justification seems required for the fact that integration is pursued through 
obligatory measures, which interfere with the freedom of immigrants to make their own decisions. It 
has already been suggested above that obligatory integration programmes can be perceived as a form 
of compulsory education, and it might be argued that such programmes are in the best interest of 
immigrants themselves because they make it easier for them to find their way in the new country, get a 
job, etc. Even if this is the case, however, this does not seem enough to justify the compulsory nature 
of integration programmes. In the case of (young) children, who are not yet considered fully 
autonomous, compulsory education can be seen as a restriction of the right of the parents to decide on 
their children’s upbringing.37 Adult immigrants, by contrast, must in principle be considered capable 
to decide about their need for education themselves. While this assumption may not apply in all cases, 
exceptions would need to be well-motivated.38  
Alternatively, the justification for compulsory integration programmes may be found in the public 
interest that is served by such measures: ensuring immigrant participation, preventing unemployment 
                                                     
34 I take the term ‘identification’ from the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) report, ‘Identification 
with the Netherlands’ (Identificatie met Nederland), published in 2007 (Dutch version available on www.wrr.nl and from 
Amsterdam University Press). The Council juxtaposes the notion of ‘identification’ to the more static notion of ‘identity’ 
and distinguishes between processes of functional, normative and emotional identification.  
35 Kostakopoulou 2010; although she focuses on integration tests and not on other integration requirements (such as an 
obligation to attend language courses), the course of Kostakopoulou’s argument suggests that she would probably not 
endorse any compulsory integration measures. As will be explained below, I nevertheless believe that, also from a 
theoretical perspective, it is worthwhile to distinguish between different types of integration requirements. 
36 An exception is Fermin 2000b. 
37 De Graaf 1999. 
38 An interesting case in this respect is the Dutch integration legislation, which identifies one of the reasons for its 
compulsory character to be the enabling of the social participation of (predominantly Muslim) immigrant women who, in 
the absence of an obligation, would not be allowed by their husbands to take an integration course. 
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and reliance on social security schemes, and so forth.39 While such interests may be legitimate, it is 
submitted that integration programmes should only be compulsory if it is clear that participation 
cannot be achieved on a voluntary basis. This is necessary to protect the autonomy of third country 
nationals, and to avoid the possibility of integration programmes obtaining a punitive character or 
being used to discourage immigrant settlement.  
 
Integration conditions 
Unlike integration obligations, which are ultimately meant to equip immigrants for citizenship, 
integration conditions result in the exclusion of individuals from entry, residence or other rights. The 
idea that being integrated requires having certain skills or abilities is thus translated into exclusion 
from citizenship of those who do not possess these abilities or skills. It is sometimes claimed that the 
exclusionary nature of integration conditions is in fact opposed to the goal of integration.40 This 
argument seems to rely on the (often implicit) premise that immigrants who are targeted by integration 
conditions are to be included in the community or polity to which the integration policy is addressed. 
In other words, the determination of who is entitled to citizenship is taken to precede the question of 
who must be integrated. As explained above, however, integration conditions are based on the 
assumption that integration, or the capacity to integrate, is precisely one of the criteria to determine 
who has access to citizenship. The purpose of integration conditions is not (or not primarily) to 
include, but to select and thereby to reserve citizenship to those who have a certain capacity or skills 
deemed necessary for further integration. 
Following this account of integration as a selection criterion, the idea that integration can be 
promoted by excluding certain immigrants is not a contradictio in terminis. However, where a 
capacity for integration becomes a decisive criterion for access to residence or other rights, it thereby 
takes priority over other criteria such as family relationships or social ties. In EU law, for example, the 
Family Reunification Directive reflects that the existence of family ties with a person residing in the 
EU is a ground for the admission of third-country nationals. Where the admission of family members 
is made dependent on integration conditions, however, integration capacity overrides those family ties 
as the criterion determining whether or not admission ought to be granted. The same occurs with 
regard to other rights: where successfully passing an integration test becomes a condition for obtaining 
permanent residence, it is given more weight than other criteria, such as the duration of residence or 
the extent of the social ties that have been built up during such residence. The question with regard to 
integration conditions is therefore what role integration should play in determining access to 
membership, especially in relation to other elements that may justify inclusion.  
As stated above, I agree with the view of integration as an interactive process between immigrants 
and the host society. Participation and a sense of belonging may be aided when immigrants are 
familiar with the language and ways of the host country, or have a certain level of education, but will 
not come about as a result of such attributes alone.41 For this reason, giving a lot of weight to a 
person’s capacity for integration when deciding upon their claim for residence or admission is not 
recommended. Moreover, when taking such decisions, a person’s lack of integration capacity will 
need to be considered together with the reasons for migration and other corresponding interests that 
plead in favour of admission.42 Strong grounds for admission will exist, regardless of considerations of 
integration, where there are pressing humanitarian reasons for admission (i.e. in asylum cases) and, to 
a somewhat lesser extent, where entry is sought for the purpose of family reunification. In this regard, 
the fact that integration conditions often apply precisely to family migrants is especially problematic.43 
Where, on the other hand, there is no family relationship or a need for protection, integration 
conditions will be more easily justified. 
                                                     
39 Fermin 2000b. 
40 E.g. Guild et al 2009, p. 9. 
41 Cf. Klaver & Odé 2009. 
42 Cp. Vermeulen 2010, pp. 141-142. 
43 Idem Groenendijk 2011, pp. 29-30.  
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5. Conclusion  
What conclusions can we draw from the analysis conducted above? Section 3 has shown that there is 
no single unambiguous concept of integration, or citizenship, that explains the inclusion of integration 
requirements in the various EU migration directives. While these requirements often seem to primarily 
have a selective purpose, they are sometimes framed more as measures to support the integration of 
immigrants who have already been admitted.  
To a certain extent, which concept of integration prevails depends on the target group and the 
purpose for which residence is sought. For family members of refugees, the use of selection criteria is 
not indicated because the family as a whole is unable to return to the country of origin; whereas for 
family members of Blue Card holders, selection on the basis of integration criteria is deemed 
undesirable because of the wish to attract highly qualified workers. These reasons can explain why, for 
both of these categories, integration requirements can only be applied once admission has been 
granted and cannot constitute actual conditions for residence. It must be concluded that these 
requirements are, instead, instrumental to facilitating the inclusion of the said family members. On the 
other hand, for ‘regular’ family migrants, as for third-country nationals who were already admitted and 
seek to obtain long-term resident status, selection on the basis of their integration capacity is possible. 
Here, however, the preambles to both the FRD and LRD bear witness to the existence of a conflicting 
notion of integration, which is based on rights and equal treatment and to which integration conditions 
form an obstacle. There is thus an internal contradiction in these directives as to the underlying 
concept of integration,  
A somewhat different, but related, question concerns the locus of integration: are third-country 
nationals expected to integrate into the different Member States where they seek admission or into the 
EU as a whole? It is generally left to the discretion of the Member States to decide on the content of 
integration requirements, suggesting the absence of a European conception of integration. An 
exception was found, however, in Article 15 (3) LRD, which exempts long-term residents who have 
already met an integration requirement in the first Member State from any further requirements but 
participation in language courses. This suggests a certain level of mutual recognition by Member 
States of the standards of integration applied elsewhere in the EU, which in turn stands in 
contradiction to the express exemption of harmonising measures in Article 79 (4) TFEU. 
It follows that there is room for a more uniform and consistent concept of integration in EU 
immigration law, regarding both the way in which integration is to be achieved (through selection or 
facilitation) and the level at which it is to occur. Section 4 has explored, on a more theoretical level, 
the role of integration requirements in relation to conceptions of integration and citizenship. It was 
established that integration requirements necessarily require some form of ‘active’ contribution by 
immigrants, presupposing an understanding of citizenship that sees citizens as individuals capable of 
autonomous decision making, as participants in the public sphere or as persons with a shared sense of 
belonging. Integration requirements can fit into a vision of integration as an interactive and dynamic 
process, provided that they are combined with other measures that also address the recipient society. 
Lastly, the form of integration requirements has important consequences for the question of who 
becomes a citizen. In the case of integration obligations, the immigrants concerned are already 
members of the community (be it as nationals or legal residents). While a justification is needed to 
subject them to coercive measures, non-compliance will not result in their exclusion. This is different 
in the case of integration conditions, which make integration, or integration capacity, into a decisive 
criterion for membership. As argued above, this criterion will need to be balanced against other 
grounds for inclusion, including the social or family ties that may already exist. It is submitted that, 
especially where family reunification is concerned, the use of integration capacity as an admission 
requirement deserves to be reconsidered.  
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